From a British perspective, but for which the book was not necessarily compiled, the most likely route for such judgments into Europe will be via the Hague Conventions of 2005 and 2019. That these are barely mentioned is entirely justified by the fact that 21 separate statements of the same basic principles would have been pointless. But, for judgments which do not benefit from these schemes, the accounts in these chapters will be somewhat informative. Again, from an English perspective, it is a pity that the status of the bilateral Conventions is not accorded comprehensive treatment: the Austrian chapter assumes (p.32) that it is back in use; the German states (p.144) that it is a matter of debate; and, for the other states party to such a Convention, nothing is said. But then, the book is not written for the sole benefit of English lawyers.

The extent to which the accounts are reliable is hard to assess. But the proposition (p.207) that recognition (as distinct from enforcement) of a judgment under the common law of Ireland requires an application to court is questionable; and the statement that the Irish courts do not enforce non-money judgments (p.213) is misleading, for, if the foreign judgment will be recognised as res judicata as to liability, its impact in proceedings will be substantial, if not decisive. The statement in relation to Cyprus (p.90), given in the context of the statutory procedure for the registration of an English judgment, that “this article also permits the litigating parties to seek an application setting aside the foreign judgment as soon as the judgment is registered, as during the registration process, it cannot be enforced” surely cannot mean what it says. One might also struggle with (p.95): “Given that Cypriot courts establish their jurisdiction in international cases very broadly, it seems that it will be difficult to oppose the recognition of a foreign judgment in Cyprus on grounds of lack of jurisdiction. This will be possible in cases where foreign courts have