Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
BAREBOAT CHARTERERS AND THIRD PARTIES: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR TETTENBORN
Alexander Yean *
When a head charterer O bareboat charters his vessel to X, who in turn sub-bareboat charters that vessel to C, the lawful termination of the head charter by O ought immediately to entitle O to seek possession of the vessel from C; the sub-charter ought not to provide C with any defence to O’s claim for possession. It is respectfully submitted that Professor Tettenborn’s argument to the contrary is unconvincing, not only because it leads to commercially untenable repercussions, but because it is contrary to the foundation on which C’s lawful possession must rest—namely, the requirement of O’s consent/authority.
In a thought-provoking essay published in this Quarterly,1 Professor Tettenborn makes the following central claim vis-à-vis a sub-bareboat charter:2
“An owner, O, bareboat charters to X, which sub-charters to C for a shorter period: the head charter is then terminated. Assuming the sub-charter period has not expired, can C resist a claim for return of the vessel? This, it is submitted, can be answered only by going back to first principles. And, if one does this, the answer, it is suggested, is plain. C wins.”
The aim of this response is to challenge this claim. It is submitted that it is difficult to sustain, both as a matter of logic and doctrine, and as a matter of commercial practicality and expectations.
It will be convenient to begin with considering the surprising consequences that would flow from Professor Tettenborn’s conclusion, at the end of which discussion it will become clear that the conclusion is indefensible.
The two-party/one-charter situation between O and X
The starting point of the analysis is what happens when the head charter is terminated by O. At the outset, it is worth observing that, if the head charter is terminated by O, that is often (though not always)3 as a result of X’s having failed to pay hire (which is
* Barrister, Twenty Essex. The author is most grateful to Professor Tettenborn for offering his thoughts in correspondence in relation to some of the preliminary ideas that have formed the basis of this response, albeit neither of us has yet managed to persuade the other.
1. AM Tettenborn, “Bareboat Charterers and Third Parties” [2025] LMCLQ 318 (“Tettenborn”).
2. Ibid, 319.
3. Other breaches by X that could give rise to a contractual or common law right for O to terminate include breaches of the obligation to properly maintain the vessel, or of trading restrictions imposed on the vessel’s employment.
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