Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
THE “MAREVA” INJUNCTION—RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Frank Meisel
Lecturer in Law, The University of Birmingham.
It is four years since the Mareva injunction was devised by the Commercial Court and blessed by the Court of Appeal; first in Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis
1 and then in the case from which the procedure takes its name: Mareva Compania SA v. International Bulk Carriers,2 Both these cases, and many subsequent applications, have concerned claims against defaulting foreign-based charterers,3 the claimants indulging in desperate “asset-hunting” through the English courts seised of jurisdiction frequently only by virtue of a London arbitration clause or an English law provision in the charter-party.4
The object of the application is to prevent the defendant from removing his assets from within the jurisdiction, thus preserving them pending action and subsequent execution of judgment. Whilst Judgment in Default of Appearance and Summary Judgment under the Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 14, are relatively speedy remedies where the defendant has no true defence, they may yet be too slow to prevent the removal of assets by the defendant, leaving the successful plaintiff with a judgment he cannot enforce. The problem is particularly acute when the asset is a sum of money standing to the credit of the defendant in a bank account, the removal of which can be effected at the stroke of a pen, and many of the applications made do seek the freezing of bank accounts maintained in London.
The availability of this new injunction, applied for ex parte in the absence of the defendant, is, therefore, a most useful additional weapon in the hands of the plaintiff (or a counter-claiming defendant) and, as such, has been generally welcomed by the commercial community.
Despite early enthusiasm by the courts there have, however, recently been signs of greater caution5 and clearer guidelines as to the criteria for its granting and the ambit of its operation have emerged. With applications running at about 20 per month, it is obviously important that the court’s discretion is uniformly exercised. Recent
3 The background is helpfully explained by Kerr, J., in Ibrahim Shanker Co. v. Distos Compania Naviera SA (The Siskind)
[1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 404, 405.
4 In Rasu Maritima SA v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina)
[1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 397 (C.A.), the assets were goods which at the time of the injunction application happened to be lying in Liverpool docks bound for Hamburg.
5 See, e.g., Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine SS (The Pythia) [1979] 2 All E.R. 972, per Mustill, J.
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