When Mr Michael Summerskill delivered the inaugural lecture of this Institute, those present were fortunate to hear a scholarly and original address set in a broad perspective. The speaker examined the field of maritime law in practical terms, but from a fresh point of view. No doubt in future years the speakers will decide to deal in detail with specific aspects of maritime law. For the moment, however, it seems appropriate to continue in a similar vein. Mr Summerskill himself looked at maritime law in terms of three groups: the people in the market-place, the academics and the practitioners. Members of the last two groups often contemplate the subject in the abstract. Propositions of law are unconsciously regarded as having an independent existence, just as propositions of mathematics are conceived to be valid, even in isolation from any concrete subject-matter. This is a mistake, as any member of the first group would soon point out. Shipping law cannot exist without ships. More importantly, it cannot exist without people who deal with ships: owners, charterers, shipping brokers, insurers. The subject-matter of shipping law is the body of relationships established between the people in the market-place through the medium of contracts. The people in the market-place look at shipping law from within. Academics and lawyers study it from outside, for the purpose of elucidating those contracts, by ascertaining the meaning of what they say, and supplying what they do not say through the medium of implied terms. Notwithstanding the growth of international legislation, the raw material of shipping law continues to be found in the individual contracts made by the businessmen, which the lawyer tries to systematize and classify, so as to enable the businessman to be informed of his rights, when a dispute arises out of a particular type of transaction or a particular choice of words.

This process of making generalizations about maritime contracts is of no great interest to the businessman. He is content to raise the question of law, and let the lawyer supply the answers, without concerning himself with how they are reached. It is an altogether different matter when it comes to issues of fact. There is nothing arcane about the elucidation of facts. The businessman can follow what is going on, and feels himself competent to express an opinion. He therefore takes a keen interest in the techniques employed in the resolution of disputes, i.e. in the machinery of justice. He is, however, impelled to study the subject in close focus, by reference to his experience in the individual disputes with which he has been concerned. He is not well-placed to generalize, or to exert influence towards improvements in the system. The practitioner naturally takes an interest, for he earns his living by conducting disputes. His perspective will be wider than that of the businessman, but he will still see the subject from within. Practitioners have neither the time nor the inclination to be introspective,