One might think, seeing that a shipowner has a lien for freight, demurrage and other charges over the goods he carries, that he had little to worry about if such charges were not paid. All he has to do is to put pressure on the goods owner by refusing to release the goods, and in the last resort by threatening to sell them to recoup himself. But, of course, this provides a misleading view of the situation. Ships are expensive; their owners’ time is money; using them as floating warehouses for goods the carrier is exercising a lien over, rather than for profitable carriage of other cargoes, simply does not make economic sense.

Small wonder, then, that shipping lawyers have always been interested in finding ways of extending the carrier’s lien so as to cover goods even after they have been unloaded and the carrier’s vessel thus freed for the use it was intended for. The point of this article is simply to discuss when and how this can be done.

The chief obstacle to be overcome by carriers in this situation is, of course, the well-established doctrine that the carrier’s lien over the goods he is carrying is merely possessory. Like any other common law lien—or, for that matter, common law pledge— it depends on the person seeking to exercise it remaining in possession of the goods concerned; prima facie, once possession is voluntarily given up, the lien automatically disappears. Of course, it is possible to create non-possessory securities over personal property in English law, notably the equitable charge; but this itself raises a host of other problems, not least the possible intervention of the registration provisions of the Companies Act 1985. As a result, the prudent shipping lawyer will concentrate, if possible, on preserving his common law lien if he can. This is not quite such a forlorn hope, moreover, as it seems at first sight; such liens may depend on possession, but possession is an attractively malleable concept that can, with a little care, be turned to good account by the enterprising carrier, as we shall see later.

This is perhaps the most bare-faced and unsophisticated ploy by shipowners anxious to extend their rights. We take as a straightforward example cl. 21 of the common Exxonvoy 1969 form of charter. This provides as follows:

With the effect of this clause in American law we are not concerned here1 (the Exxonvoy form, after all, is American-drafted); but what effect, if any, do the italicized