Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
COSTS AND LLOYD’S FORM SALVAGE ARBITRATIONS
The Ios I
In The Ios I,
1 Leggatt, J., reiterated well established principles as to the basis on which an order for costs should be made, following a decision on the merits in an arbitration, in the following terms:
The practice, as in cases at law, is for costs to follow the event, with the result that, in the ordinary case, a successful party recovers his costs. An important exception to that general rule is where an offer has been put before an arbitrator or a payment has been made into court which exceeds the amount awarded or in respect of which judgment is given. That is what occurred here. In such a case it is usual for the person who has made the offer to be awarded his costs after the date when the offer was made.
The usual practice mentioned above is clearly set out in Tramountana Armadora S.A. v. Atlantic Shipping Co. S.A.
2 In The Ios I, Leggatt, J., summarized the principles which apply when an arbitrator has departed from that practice. He referred to the decision in The Takamine,
3 where Robert Goff, J., had held that:
Arbitrators, like a trial judge, have a discretion as to the costs which they may award in a particular case … [Arbitrators may, in the exercise of their discretion, depart from [the] normal order. But if they do depart from that normal order then it is open to a party, who is seeking to set aside the arbitrator’s award as to costs, either by relying upon the reasons given by the arbitrator or, in the absence of such reasons, placing evidence before the court, [to] establish that the evidence or reasons do not justify a departure from the general principle, and if the party does so then the court may interfere and set aside or remit the award as to costs. But, the circumstances in which the court will do so are very limited.4
Indeed, even if an arbitrator (in the opinion of the court) may have exercised his discretion wrongly, if he had any grounds on which he could exercise his discretion in the way he did, then the court will not interfere, for it cannot be said affirmatively that the arbitrator was wrong in what he did.5 Accordingly, the party seeking to set aside the award must, in order to succeed, establish that the arbitrator had no material before him upon which he could properly justify the exercise of his discretion.
In The Ios I, the respondent cargo owners made a sealed offer which exceeded the amount of salvage awarded by the appeal arbitrator against them. The appeal arbitrator did not give effect to the sealed offer nor did he give any reasons for departing from the usual practice of awarding costs to the party making a successful offer. On the material before the court, the order made as to costs was therefore “inexplicable” and not one which “any reasonable arbitrator, properly directing
3. Wilh. Wilhelmsen v. Canadian Transport Co. (The Takamine) [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 204.
4. Ibid., 209.
5. P. Rosen & Co. Ltd. v. Dowley and Selby [1943] 2 All E.R. 172, per Atkinson, J.; followed in L. Figueiredo Navegacas S.A. v. Reederei Richard Schroeder K.G. (The Erich Schroeder) [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 192, 194, per Mocatta, J.
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