Fitzgerald v. Lane

Despite obvious dissimilarities between road accidents and maritime collisions, the determination of cause and loss in both cases involves a similar analytical process. This congruence is emphasized where principles of apportionment are adopted in cases of contributory negligence, under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 and the Maritime Conventions Act 1911.1 Constructing a scheme of apportionment is problematic and can be exacerbated by legal precedents which draw parallels between the 1911 Act and the 1945 Act.2 Arguably, disparities in the statutory language employed would tend to discourage identical interpretation and application, notably in multipartite litigation. Recently, in Fitzgerald v. Lane 3 the House of Lords attempted to clarify the interpretation of the 1945 Act, referring to maritime cases heard under the 1911 Act. This Comment will assess the impact of the Fitzgerald decision and its potential ramifications in maritime law.

The plaintiff crossed a busy dual carriageway via a pedestrian crossing controlled by traffic lights. The lights clearly demonstrated that traffic had right of way at the time. However, the nearside lane of traffic had come to a halt. The plaintiff stepped off the pavement without looking. Having cleared the nearside lane he was struck by the off-side wing of a car driven by the first defendant (Dl). The plaintiff was thrown into the air and, on landing, was struck by a car being driven in the opposite direction by the second defendant (D2). The plaintiff sustained serious injuries.

In the High Court, Sir Douglas Frank, Q.C., sitting as a deputy judge, found that all three parties had been negligent and were “equally to blame”. As it could not be