The title of this work is something of a misnomer since, as the text makes abundantly clear, there are a number of legal regimes which can apply to straits. The principal thrust of the work concerns the passage of vessels through what have become known as “international straits” and the critical questions concern the identification of the regime relevant to the strait at issue and the manner in which the applicable regime strikes the balance between the interests of the coastal State(s) and the freedom of navigation. Although the basic framework of this topic is well understood, there are numerous points of detail which remain to be explored and this book is a useful contribution to the debates which surround them.

The book is structured in a generally sensible and straightforward fashion. Inevitably, it draws heavily upon the judgments of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel and Fisheries Jurisdiction cases of 1949 and 1951. The first issue to be addressed concerns the definition of an international strait. Chapter 2 considers a number of geographical criteria and concludes that for the purposes of customary international law the question of whether a body of water is a “strait” depends on the “narrowness” of the stretch of water in question (i.e., that it comprises overlapping territorial seas of coastal States), that it connects areas of high seas (or EEZs) and that passage is possible without the use of navigational aids. The author considers that straits which connect areas of high seas with the territorial seas of a State (e.g., the Straits of Tiran at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba giving access to the Israeli port of Eilat), though recognized as straits in the 1958 Territorial Sea and 1982 Law of the Sea Conventions, are not within the customary law definition of a strait. The author recognizes that his conclusion that passage must be possible without the use of navigational aids is problematic, since it would mean that some stretches of water would be “straits” for smaller, shallow draft vessels, but not for larger vessels.

Once the geographical criteria have been met, it is then necessary to determine whether they are “used” for international navigation and this is tackled in Chapter 3. Following the ICJ, the author concludes that it is sufficient for it to be shown that the straits are being used, not that there is the need that they be used, and engages in a helpful exploration of what might constitute “international” navigation as opposed to cabotage, the relevance of regional use, international cross-Channel use, flags of convenience and the relevance of passage by various types of vessel.

Chapter 4 digresses in order to examine a number of odd situations in which it would be possible to classify a strait as a bay, such as the Solent. It might have been helpful if it had been pointed out at the beginning of the chapter, rather than at the end, that the importance of the distinction lies in there being no right of innocent passage through a bay, which is comprised of internal waters. The examples given are indeed problematic but are also on the margins of the topic and the title given to the chapter is potentially misleading since it could be taken to imply that there is a more general relationship between straits and bays.

Having dealt with the definition of an international strait, the remaining chapters look at the legal regimes of passage. Chapter 5 considers the law relating to passage prior to UNCLOS III. First of all, an overview of innocent passage is given which highlights the essentially subjective nature of the criterion of “innocence” in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention. This is followed by a consideration of the vexed question of whether warships can exercise a right of innocent passage. Despite the depth of the examination, the author’s views are difficult to extract and, to the extent that they can be identified, are Delphic. This sets the scene for the presentation of the Corfu Channel judgment and emergence of non-suspendible innocent passage in straits used for international navigation. The author stresses, however, that this does not preclude the possibility of a coastal State requiring prior notification of passage and that the ambiguities surrounding the criterion of “innocence” also remained a problem. Chapter 6 rounds off consideration of the pre-UNCLOS