The design of insurance contract remedies in England and Wales is of fundamental importance. The nature of the remedies provides the immediate context in which the substantive rules must be assessed. The reason why the rules relating to utmost good faith, non-compliance with policy terms and fraudulent claims matter is that they each provide a substantial remedy for the insurer: most commonly, that all (or at least some) of the liability under the policy is discharged. Traditional English insurance law recognised a strict “order of performance” model for insurance contract law. Performance was sequential: the insurer could be called upon to pay a claim under the contract only if the insured had performed. This often created rules that favoured the underwriter, but not always. There were examples where the default remedy was weak.2 What did not normally occur was any attempt to separate the order of performance from the quality of performance. The requirement of strict performance by the insured as a precondition to insurer action denied the possibility of a proportionate remedy.3 It is clear from the development of insurance law that this is the type of remedy that insurers want, but is it what the industry needs?