It is rare that a superior court considers and develops the long-settled principles relating to contractual offer and acceptance, yet such an opportunity was presented recently to the New Zealand Supreme Court in Dysart Timbers Ltd v. Nielsen.1 The issue before the Supreme Court arose out of proceedings brought by Dysart Timbers Ltd (“Dysart”) to enforce a guarantee that the Nielsen brothers (“the Nielsens”) had given in respect of the indebtedness of Castlerock Group Ltd. The Nielsens’ defence was that the proceedings should be discontinued owing to a deed of settlement that covered their liability under the guarantee. Whilst the Auckland High Court accepted this contention,2 the New Zealand Court of Appeal reversed this decision.3 Subsequently, the Nielsens applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that, otherwise, there would be a miscarriage of justice. On 9 August 2007, at 9.23am, the Nielsens’ counsel sent an email, offering to pay a fixed sum in full and final settlement of the parties’ dispute and indicated that, upon payment, “the leave application to the Supreme Court will be discontinued”. At 12.30pm, the Supreme Court’s Registrar informed the parties that leave to appeal had been granted.