Litigation Letter
Sexual assault claims
A v Hoare and four other actions HoL TLR 31 January; NLJ 8 February p218
Section 2(1) of the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions, etc DC) Act 1954 reduced the period of limitation from six years to
three years for actions for damages, the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty where the damages were in respect of personal
injuries and s1 of the Limitation Act 1975, now s11 of the 1980 Act, allowed the three years to run from the claimant’s date
of knowledge as defined in s14. Section 33 gives the court a discretion where a claim would otherwise fail under s11, to extend
the period when it appeared equitable to do so. The House of Lords in
Stubbings v Webb [1993] AC 498 upheld that s11 did not apply to cases of deliberate assault, including acts of indecent assault, and therefore
they fell within s2. In the context of limitation of actions, the phrase ‘negligence, nuisance or breach of duty’ made its
first appearance in s2(1) of the 1954 Act. At that time the phrase had already been judicially construed as having a wide
meaning. By the time the Limitation Act 1975 introduced what was now s11, a uniform line of authority in England and Australia
held that the phrase was to be construed as applying to intentional injuries. Parliament must have intended the words to bear
that meaning. Stubbings had been wrongly decided. Because it had created anomalies, it was right to depart from it. The limitation
period of three years ran from the date when the victim first considered the injury sufficiently serious to justify proceedings,
but the court can extend that period if it thinks it equitable. In determining the date, the test is whether a reasonable
person with the claimant’s knowledge would have, considered the injury sufficiently serious. Such personal characteristics
of the claimant that might have prevented him from acting as a reasonable person would have were a matter for any exercise
of judicial discretion. Two of the cases were remitted for s33 consideration, one was remitted to the judge for reconsideration
in the light of the opinions of the house and the remaining claimants would receive the damages, which the judges would have
awarded had they not been bound to apply s2.