Litigation Letter
Capping defamation costs
Henry v BBC [2005] EWHC 2503 (QB)
In the allocation questionnaire in defamation proceedings against the BBC, the BBC estimated its costs to the end of the trial
at £290,000. The claimant’s estimate was £360,000, excluding her CFA success fee, any ATE premium and VAT. The claimant’s
solicitors subsequently increased their estimate to £694,000, again excluding the success fee, any ATE premium and VAT, with
the result that assuming a success fee of 100% the potential exposure of the BBC in respect of the costs of the action, inclusive
of VAT, was £1.6m. In these circumstances the BBC sought the protection of a cost-capping order. Although the judge thought
the case was a prime candidate for a cost-capping order, the application was made only a week before the trial of the action
and therefore was made too late. The BBC could and should have been informed of the escalating costs far sooner, especially
in view of the existence of a CFA which might well double the costs exposure of the BBC. It was hoped that in future, where
a litigant encountered difficulty in obtaining information about his opponent’s costs position, an application would be made
pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Costs Practice Direction for an order for an estimate. While the judge had every sympathy for
the predicament in which the BBC, through no fault of its own, found itself, it did not follow that it would be right at that
stage of the proceedings to impose a costs cap. Any cap would have to be prospective. The imposition of a costs cap so close
to trial would in effect penalise the claimant, or perhaps more accurately the legal advisers, when the purpose of a capping
order is to enable the capped party to plan ahead the appropriate level of expenditure to bring the case to trial at a cost
which is in line with the amount of the cap. It would be wrong to use the cost-capping jurisdiction in a way which would deny
the claimant the benefit of the CFA to which she was statutorily entitled. The application was made too late. The judge also
gave another reason why he would not make a cost-capping order: he did not feel qualified to determine without assistance
from a costs judge the amount of the brief fees, the charging rates and how much work between the application and the end
of the trial would be reasonable and proportionate. The exercise was more suitable for a costs judge, or at least a judge
sitting with a costs judge.