This short book contains the text of a lecture which Professor Burrows gave in two parts at the University of Hong Kong in October 2001. Its general theme, the fusion of common law and equity, is the same as that of the inaugural lecture, “We do this at Common Law but that in Equity” (2002) 22 O.J.L.S. 1, which Professor Burrows gave in Oxford in March 2001. Indeed, the first part of the Hochelaga lecture is an expanded version of the inaugural lecture. It examines the differences between monetary remedies for common law wrongs and equitable wrongs (and the need or justification for the differences) under seven heads. Some of these heads are relatively narrow, such as compound interest, punitive (or exemplary) damages and anticipated wrongs.

The head which receives the fullest treatment (compensation) identifies four main restrictions on compensatory damages: remoteness; intervening cause; the duty to mitigate; and contributory negligence. There is much of interest in this discussion. Professor Burrows concludes that the full implications of the SAAMCO case (South Australia Asset Management Corp. v. York Montague Ltd [1997] A.C. 191) have yet to be worked out, but that on any view there is a much wider discretion (or it might be said, greater scope for moulding the policy of the law) over common law damages than is sometimes asserted (or assumed).

The discussion of restrictions on equitable compensation is also illuminating. Professor Burrows identifies two main schools (with shades of opinion in between): those who regard many of the common law restrictions as inapplicable to equitable compensation, and those who see no good reason for any distinction, at any rate where the equitable obligation breached was a duty of skill and care. Unsurprisingly, Professor Burrows prefers the second view and he provides some compelling citations, mainly from Commonwealth authorities, in support of it.

The second part of the lecture, on personal restitution of misdirected funds, is no less interesting. Here the author’s general position is that Lipkin Gorman Ltd v. Karpnale [1991] 2 A.C. 548, a decision applying (and extending) common law principles, is a major landmark in the law of restitution (he has described it elsewhere as the Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 of restitution law) but that the corresponding equitable principles are in disarray. He sees Lord Nicholls as the best judicial guide out of the disarray, both in Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378 and extra-curially in “Knowing Receipt: the need for a new landmark” in Cornish et al., Restitution: Past, Present and Future (1998), 231. The path to be followed is to stop debating whether dishonesty, unconscionability or negligence is the proper basis for liability on the ground of knowing receipt: the correct principle, the argument runs, is that of “strict liability subject to defences” (the defences including change of position).

The decision of the House of Lords in Twinsectra Ltd v. Yardley [2002] UKHL 2; [2002] 2 W.L.R. 12 is referred to with anticipation in the lecture—in the event Lord Nicholls did not sit—and it has now come. It was a case on dishonest assistance, but the division revealed by Lord Millett’s dissenting speech shows that Tan has not laid every doubt to rest. Lord Millett made an observation

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