Two recent decisions—The Catur Samudra 1 in Singapore and The Decurion 2 in Hong Kong—turned on the meaning of the word “control” for the purpose of the mode of exercise of Admiralty jurisdiction. At the heart of the cases is the question whether determination of “control” is a strictly factual inquiry, or whether it engages legal concepts. Both courts came down unequivocally in favour of the view that “control” must exist as a legal right, as opposed to a factual state of affairs. Unfortunately, neither court gave compelling reasons for its decision—the best that the five judges involved could do was to invoke the twin talismans of “uncertainty” and unwillingness to “lift the corporate veil”, terms which certainly strike fear into the hearts of properly indoctrinated lawyers everywhere, but which are often, as here, uttered somewhat too lightly. In short, both cases exhibit an undercurrent of judicial desire to limit the availability of the statutory action in rem. But why?